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Securities Litigation As A Window Into
Supreme Court Litigation
Remarks of Thomas Goldstein*
Thanks very much. For me, to give a talk to this group of experts
about securities law is a little bit like carrying coals to Newcastle. It
seems unlikely that I will educate you about what’s going on in the
Supreme Court’s securities law jurisprudence when you know infinitely
more about that topic than I do. And so I thought it would be more
helpful if I came at this from the perspective of the strategy of the
lawyers involved in the cases at the Court.
Why might that matter? As the lawyers who are working on the
cases, a huge amount of effort goes into preparing. We spend hundreds
if not thousands of hours preparing the briefs. We spend God-awful
amounts of time practicing for oral argument. But once the decision is
issued, the sense among lawyers, academics, and the public is that the
outcome was preordained—that is, that the law required X, or at least
that these nine Justices would inevitably have decided X. There is no
real sense that the lawyers made any difference. So there is a real
question: does the advocacy change the outcome? Does it make any
difference at all?
Also, sometimes the Court’s opinions don’t tell the whole story. The
written ruling has to conform to all the basic principles of judicial
decisionmaking. But the Justices are human beings. And as lawyers,
we try to tap into all their motivations. So the advocacy may drive
decisions in ways that you can’t see without looking behind the scenes.
To elaborate on those points, I propose to give you my perspective on
two securities cases I worked on last term. I argued the Chadbourne &
Parke LLP v. Troice 1 case, which arose under the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”). I was also heavily involved in
coordinating the plaintiffs’ side of Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund
(“Halliburton II”), which involved the continuing vitality of the “fraud

* Partner, Goldstein & Russell, P.C.; Publisher, SCOTUSblog.
1. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014).
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on the market presumption.” 2
To remind you of the background, Troice is the Ponzi scheme case
involving Allen Stanford, who owned the modestly named Stanford
International Bank in Antigua. Allen Stanford made the compelling
case to investors that if they would give him their money he would issue
a certificate of deposit (“CD”) and, miracle upon miracles, he would
give them a substantially above-market rate of return. 3
But rather than invest the money, Stanford bought a lot of polo
ponies, which did not provide the rate of return that one would have
hoped. 4 He bought a lot of land in Antigua, which is a lovely place, but
is still not something that’s going to generate a huge return. 5 Almost $6
billion turned into around $200 million. 6 It was a Ponzi scheme—
money from new investors went to pay off redemptions and to pay
interest. A lot of retirees lost all of their savings and those folks sued
Allen Stanford and his advisers who allegedly participated in the
scheme. 7
They sued under state law. The district court dismissed the suits
under SLUSA, 8 which requires the dismissal of a state law class action
that alleges a misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security.
SLUSA is the successor not just to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but
also the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”). Congress
had passed the PSLRA to make it much tougher to bring securities class
actions in federal court. That led plaintiffs to file suit in state court
instead. SLUSA responded to that maneuver.

2. See generally Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. —, 134 S.
Ct. 2398 (2014).
3. Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1059–60.
4. See Steven Berk, Depression Postpones Allen Stanford Ponzi Scheme Trial, CORP.
OBSERVER (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.thecorporateobserver.com/2011/01/07/depression-postpon
es-allen-stanford-ponzi-scheme-trial/ (discussing how Stanford abused investment funds by
spending them on private jets and polo ponies).
5. See Nick Davis, Allen Stanford: Antigua Feels the Fallout of Ponzi Case, BBC NEWS (Mar.
8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17298267 (reporting that Antigua was in “dire need
of foreign direct investment” at the time Stanford set up his offshore bank).
6. See Cole Epley, Allen Standford’s Accounting Execs Convicted of Wire Fraud, MEMPHIS
BUS. J. (Nov. 20, 2012, 11:31 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/news/2012/11/20/
allen-stanfords-accounting-execs.html (reporting that Stanford and his accountants told investors
that his Antiguan bank had more than $5 billion, when it actually held less that $200 million).
7. Scott Cohn, Five Years After Stanford Scandal, Many Victims Penniless, CNBC (Feb. 15,
2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101418516# (describing many of Stanford’s investors as nowpenniless retired oil workers).
8. Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1060.
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Critically, SLUSA is narrower than 10(b) and the PSLRA. The latter
apply to a misrepresentation “in connection with the purchase or sale of
[a] security,” 9 whereas SLUSA applies more narrowly to a
misrepresentation or omission “in connection with a purchase or sale of
a covered security.” 10 A covered security generally is a security that’s
traded on a national exchange. 11 So, SLUSA says you can’t file a statelaw securities suit involving a nationally traded security. Congress
decided those cases needed to be litigated under federal law because the
issuer has no idea where his or her purchasers are located. If you’re
IBM and you’re selling your stock, it’s not fair to IBM to have to
defend these cases in every single state around the country; instead,
federal court is the appropriate forum.
The question in Troice was: What do you do when the
misrepresentation involves the sale of something that is not a covered
security? A CD is not traded on a national exchange, so it is not a
covered security. On the other hand, in selling the CDs, Stanford said
something along the lines of, “if you give me your money, I’ll invest it
in the stock market.” According to the Troice defendants, SLUSA
applied because he was saying lies about covered securities that were
causing people to buy the non-covered CDs.
So the fraud was one step removed from covered securities. The
issue presented by the case was: when is there is a sufficient connection
with the purchase or sale of covered security even though what the
fraud involves the sale of something else?
After the district court dismissed the complaints, the Fifth Circuit
ordered the suits over the Stanford CDs reinstated. 12 The defendants
filed three certiorari petitions. The Supreme Court called for the views
of the Solicitor General, who advised the Justices to take the case and
rule for the defendants. The Court granted the petitions.
As the plaintiffs’ lawyer, I faced an obvious dilemma: a conservative
majority on the U.S. Supreme Court views plaintiffs—and class action
plaintiffs in particular—with deep suspicion. The defense community
has convinced the majority that there is too much abusive litigation of
all kinds, including securities class sanctions. In general, the Court is
convinced that litigation is a drain on the economy and on innovation.
So, the defense perspective in arguing that the Supreme Court should

9.
10.
11.
12.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A).
Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2012).
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take the Troice case and reverse was: we are companies; they are class
action plaintiffs’ lawyers; are we done yet?
It then got worst because the one thing you kind of hope for if you’re
going to be on the plaintiffs’ side is some measure of support from a
Democratic administration. So when the Court calls for the use of the
Obama administration’s Solicitor General, one ordinarily expects the
government would say that these plaintiffs have a perfectly fine state
law cause of action. Instead, the Obama administration said, “oh no,
you cannot have this kind of lawsuit.” 13
That was initially a puzzle and a significant problem. But it ended up
being our savior. That was so because the Obama administration had an
angle in supporting the defendants. Anybody who files an amicus brief
has an angle; they want something done. So why was the United States
in this case saying we think the defendant should win?
The answer requires going back to the source of SLUSA’s text: “in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” 14 The “in
connection with” language was the key to the question in Troice. The
issue at bottom was how close a fraud must be to a regulated sale to be
subject to the securities laws.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was in the case
because the “in connection with” phrase comes from 10(b), which is
enforced by the SEC. The government was on the side of the Troice
defendants because the defendants were arguing for a broad reading of
“in connection with.” 15 The defendants wanted to tie the non-covered
CDs to the covered securities that Stanford claimed that he was buying.
What the SEC wanted to do was apply a defense victory in Troice to
expand its own authority under 10(b). The SEC wanted to be able to
bring cases in which defendants engaged in fraud with respect to the
sale of a non-security through statements about securities.
So what I said to the Supreme Court was that this Stanford thing was
really a one-off silly case under SLUSA. There aren’t any other of
these. Don’t be bothered about it; there’s never been another case like
this and there never will be anymore. Instead, the real implication of
the case is for the scope of 10(b). If you rule for the defendants, then
the SEC will bring many more 10(b) cases. Then the plaintiffs’ bar—
13. The Obama administration represented the Securities and Exchange Commission,
supporting the defendants. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Justices Say Allen Stanford Victims Can Sue
Lawyers, Brokers, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2014, 4:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/
26/us-usa-court-stanford-idUSBREA1P17220140226.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
15. Hurley, supra note 13.

GOLDSTEIN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

A Window Into Supreme Court Litigation

3/18/2015 2:26 PM

451

those evil tricky people—will bring more private suits under Section
10(b)-5. In other words, the upshot of the defendants’ legal rule is
going to be a huge amount of federal securities litigation that you don’t
want.
I do think that argument was the key to the plaintiffs’ victory. But I
don’t think that you can understand that fact just from reading the
Justices’ opinions, which provide a very incomplete story.
So if you are looking for what will drive the next SLUSA decision,
you should think about it from that perspective. If the case is going to
be about “in connection with,” you have to think about the other moreimportant provisions in which those words appear.
Now take the Halliburton II case, which is a much bigger deal. In
Halliburton II, we are dealing with the mother of all shifts on the Court:
the ongoing debate over the correctness of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson16
twenty-five years later.
The key question for the Halliburton II plaintiffs was to identify a
strategy to save Basic. We could not flip the script, as in Troice. A
defense victory in Halliburton II unquestionably would limit securities
litigation.
On the other hand, we likely had four votes to begin with: the Court’s
four more liberal Justices were unlikely to gut 10(b) class actions so
aggressively. But we needed a fifth vote.
That vote would have to come from a conservative. It seemed very
unlikely that we could persuade those Justices of the underlying
soundness of Basic. Four had affirmatively invited consideration of
whether to overrule that decision. Given the hostility to plaintiffs’ class
actions, we would need a different theme.
We settled on institutional responsibility. And we looked to the
conservative Justice who had not invited reconsidering Basic: the Chief
Justice.
So, our principal push was: this is not the case about securities law at
all. This is a case about consistency and stability—i.e., stare decisis.
We had a two-pronged approach. First, we organized a number of
briefs directed to the point that securities class actions are not a major
problem and are closely overseen by Congress. Second, we pressed
very hard the principle that errors in statutory construction get fixed by
Congress, not by overruling precedents.
That second argument had a critical subtext. The conservative

16. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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majority on the Supreme Court is anxious to have the opportunity to
overturn a number of constitutional decisions. When the Supreme
Court does that, it loves to draw the distinction that in constitutional
law—unlike statutory law—only we can fix our problems. That was
recently true in campaign finance with cases like Citizens United v.
F.E.C.17 and in issues of race with the Voting Rights Act.
So the subtext of our argument was that, if the Court’s majority was
going to rely on the distinction between statutory and constitutional
cases in those very significant contexts, it could not fairly overrule
Basic. It needed to say that if the fraud-on-the-market presumption is
an incorrect interpretation of section 10(b), then it is Congress’ job to
fix it.
That theme seemed to have taken hold. The Chief Justice’s opinion
stressed that the defendants were effectively arguing that Basic was
wrong when it was decided. So it was up to the legislature to address
that concern.
There was another part of our advocacy that should be mentioned. If
someone hostile is deciding something involving you, it is frequently
best to identify some way that they can rule against you that you can
live with. It would have been be deeply unsatisfying for the Supreme
Court majority to pass entirely on the prospect of imposing some further
limits on plaintiffs’ securities class actions. The least awful thing that
they could do was to permit the defendants to litigate price impact at the
class certification stage. We understood from lawyers in the bar that
district courts were already doing that, because defendants were
introducing event studies to disprove the efficiency of the relevant
market. So a Supreme Court ruling to that effect wouldn’t really change
anything. So another point of advocacy that you don’t quite see in the
opinion is that sometimes the Justices believe they are changing the law,
and they aren’t.
As a final point, I will contrast the defense strategy in Troice and
Halliburton II, which seemed to lack much subtlety. Their theme was,
at bottom, the brute-force point that they were the defendants and the
other side was the plaintiffs, who must lose. But in securities class
action litigation, the winning streak of the plaintiffs’ side is actually
exceptional. This doesn’t seem to be an area of the law in which the
Supreme Court is willing to reach a results-oriented decision, no matter
what the cost.

17. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310 (2010).

